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From Habsburg to Hitler to Haider: The
Peculiarities of Austrian History

Harry Ritter
Western Washington University
Inbroadoverview,the definingfeatureof Austrianhistorysince 1866hasbeen
dramaticand- since 1918 - sometimeswrenchingchange.* A greatercontrast
between the country'sserene,touristicimage andthe realhistoricalexperiencesof
itspeoplecanscarcelybe imagined.Otherregions- Poland,theformerYugoslavia,
the formerSoviet Union - endured,to be sure, greaterhumanextremes and far
greatertotalmiseryin ourcentury. Sadly,the plightof thesenationsoften occurred
at the hands of Austrian-bredofficials and soldiers, from Hitler, Eichmann,
on down.'Yet if othercountriessufferedmore,few,
Globocnik,andKaltenbrunner
in sucha brieftime-span,werereimaginedandreinventedso often,in so manyways
- politically, geographically,emotionally. Smallwonderthat"identity"has long
been a quandaryof Austrianlife. Even casual observersof Austria'smodem past
could roughlytrace its radicalpeaks and valleys:
...Habsburg Austria's exclusion from Bismarck's emerging north German
Reich following defeat in the Austro-PrussianWarof 1866;
...the final collapse of the centuries-oldHabsburgdynasticstate at the end of
WorldWarI;
...creation of a derelict German-Austrianrepublic from (in Clemenceau's
phrase)"whatwas left over"once the empire's non-Germansuccessor states
were formed;
...the shortbut savage 1934 civil warandcreationof the Dollfuss dictatorship
at the heightof the GreatDepression- an entitywhich lacked,however,solid
popularsupport
...the absorptionof dwarf Austria - der Staat. den keiner wollte2- into
Hitler'sThirdReichin 1938, withtheunevencomplianceof a majority(though
far from all) of its citizens;
...rapidindustrializationof partsof the alpine region in the context of Nazi
Germany'swar economy, abruptlyacceleratingmodernization;
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...inventionof a secondKleindsterreichaftercrushingdefeatin 1945- a state
ambivalentlyregardedby the victors as, on the one hand,the "firstvictim of
Hitleriteaggression"and, on the other,a conqueredfoe requiringa decadeof
alien occupationand reeducation;
...and creationof a small, neutralrepublicunderthe State Treatyof 1955sovereign,yet still lacking(in themindsof manyof its residents)a securesense
of its legitimacyas a nation.
Recurrent,destabilizingchange,then,has been the signal attributeof Austrian
Zeitgeschichte,and new shifts are occurringtoday, a subjectto which this article
will returnat its conclusion. Butthe mainpurposeof this essay is to highlightsome
peculiarAustriancontinuitiesof the long andmediumterm,or at least patternsof
changeslow to unfold,chiefly on the level ofvalues, mentalhabits,politicalculture,
and interactionsbetween society and institutionalstructures.
The first of these continuitiesis underscoredin the title of ErnstHanisch's
impressivenew historyof Austriabetween 1890 and 1990,DerLange Schattendes
Staates: OsterreichischeGesellschaftsgeschichteim 20. Jahrhundert.3Greeted
withcontroversyinVienna,Hanisch'spanoramarepresentsnonethelessabenchmark
for future efforts to understandmoder Austria's stormy experience; anyone
seeking a reliableguide to the landmarksof contemporaryAustrianhistoryand a
balancedappraisalof its key issues will be well advised to startwith this study.
In the first thirdof his book, Hanisch identifies deep structuresof Austria's
earlymoder andmodem longue duree- culturaltraditions,mentalites,elite and
popularbehavioralpatterns,demographicandeconomictrends- stretchingback
to the conflicting legacies of the BaroqueAge and the JosefinianEnlightenment.
Despiteformidabletensionsbetweenthesetwograndtraditions(Baroquespirituality,
love of ceremony, hierarchy, plenitude, and the ornate; Josefinian austerity,
simplicity,practicality,reductionism,andrationality),they nonethelessinterlaced
to cast the "long shadow"of legalistic culture,bureaucratism,and the cameralist
state over subsequentAustrianhistory,rightdown to the presentday.4 Equivocal
in its implications,the shadow of early-modernetatism renderedAustriansillpreparedfor pluralistdemocracyand autonomousindividualismyet ironically,in
the long run, eased the pathto today's "socialpartnership,"social-liberalwelfare
society, and regulatorystate. Overall, Hanisch - a self-professed product of
Austria's Catholicpolitical heritage- gives his story (almost despite himself) a
liberalizingtwist; he emplots it as an arduous,dialecticalexpansionof individual
"life chances"(RalfDahrendorfs term)over againstthe deep-seatedauthoritarian
andantiliberalstructuresof Austrianlife - Catholictradition,anti-Semitism,and
authoritarianmindsets. At the same time, his voice is modulatedby an ironictone
relatingto theseliberalizingandemancipatoryprocesses- one alertto theunheroic
side of humanbehaviorso abundantlydemonstratedby therecentAustrianpast,and
mindful of the losses, complexities, and futureuncertaintiesas well as the gains
producedby modernization.
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WithinHanisch's statistframework,one must stressthe persistenceand slow
transformationof legalisticvaluesrevolvingaroundgroupstatusandtheprotection
(via alliancewiththe state)ofgroup entitlementsandinterests- in short,thevalues
of corporatism. Thirtyyears ago, invoking corporatismas a conceptualguide to
serious scholarshipwould have raisedarchedeyebrows,and even today it excites
mixed emotions. A modem version of the ancient notion of corporatismwas
notoriously fashionable as a social nostrum in right-wing circles of the early
twentiethcentury;after1922 it acquireda powerfulstigmain the mindsof western
progressives- liberalsandsocialistsalike- dueto its associationwithMussolini's
Fascismandits emulators.One of these imitatorswas preciselythe 1930s Austrian
dictatorshipof EngelbertDollfuss andKurtvon Schuschnigg- a politicalcul-desac that remainsan embarrassmentin Austriatoday, almost as much as the Nazi
regime itself. In the 1970s, however, the corporatisttaboo was refurbishedby
political scientists interested in interactionsbetween interest groups and the
neoliberalregulatorystate,andthereis now a swelling literatureon its relevanceto
social science.5(To avoid confusion over terms,it shouldbe noted thatthis essay
uses the expression"neoliberal"in the sense of"social liberalism"- as bornin the
era of FriedrichNaumann- as opposed to the doctrineof the unrestrainedfree
market,as the word is sometimes employednowadays).
Philippe Schmitter,a leader in the renaissanceof interest.in corporatism,
describescontemporarysocial corporatismas:
a distinctiveway of organizinginterestsand influencingpublic policy.... one
of several possible arrangementsthrough which interest associations can
intermediatebetweentheirmembers(individuals,families,firms,groupsof all
kinds) and their interlocutors(especially agencies of the state with authority
and otherresourcesto satisfy theirdemands).6
In the schematicparlanceof politicalscience, Schmittercontrastscorporatism
coordination,"
(characterized
by suchfeaturesas"monopolisticunits,""hierarchichal
and "devolved implementation")with "pluralism"(distinguishedby "multiple
units,""autonomousinteraction,"and"persuasiveconviction").7
Many authoritieswould concur that, in Austria,membershipin the type of
legally defined corporatebodies describedby Schmitterremainsa benchmarkof
identity and social possibility - i.e., an AustrianSonderbewusstsein.8This has
mitigated the definitive triumphof a pronouncedindividualistand free-market
ethos such as that associated with a group of late-nineteenth-centuryAustrian
economistsnow known(somewhatparadoxically,consideringthe smallresonance
theirdoctrineshadin post-1918Austriaitself) as the"AustrianSchool"of economic
theory. Among scholarship'sunfinishedtasksis therigorousgroundingofthe work
of these thinkers- Carl Menger, Friedrichvon Wieser, and Eugen von BohmBawerk - in the context of late- nineteenth-centuryAustrianlife.9 They were
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drawnto Smithianliberalismpreciselybecausethe antitheticalassumptionsof the
BaroqueandJosefinianPolizeistaatpersistedso stronglyandoften oppressivelyin
the Austriaof theirday. Yet even withinthe Mengerschool therewere echoes of
the regulatoryObrigkeitsstaat.Despite their hereticalattractionto laissez-faire,
theirthoughtpatternshadsubstantialcameralistroots.'0Theytoo laboredunderthe
"long shadow of the state,"and Bohm-Bawerkbecame one of the state's leading
minions as Habsburgfinance ministeron differentoccasions between 1895 and
1904. It was only a later generationof"Austrian"theorists,led by Ludwig von
Mises andFriedrichvon Hayek,who developeda full-blownantistatistversion of
Menger'sideas- andtheyhadto do it mainlyin Anglo-Americanexile. Inmany
ways the economics of Josef Schumpeter- with its stress on institutionsand
governmentsas well as marketsand heroic entrepreneurs- was a more logical
extension of the founders'ideas, especiallythose of Wieser.It would, perhaps,be
instructiveto considerthe ideas of the late Wieser,or even the late Menger(if not
Bohm-Bawerk)in relationshipto nascent currentsof Austriansocial liberalism
and (briefly) Ministerof
representedby someone like the liberalparliamentarian
TradeJosef MariaBaerenreither.12
Unlike the AustrianEconomic School, scholarshipis amply acquaintedwith
the arrayof romanticandreactionarycorporatismthatflourishedin OldAustriathose of Adam Miiller,KarlBaronvon Vogelsang, and otherprecursorsof Hugo
von Hofmannsthal'sneo-Baroque,oxymoroniccrusadefor konservativeRevolution after 1918, of the holist sociology of OthmarSpann, and ultimately the
FatherlandFrontof Dollfuss and Schuschnigg. In practicalterms,however,just as
significant as such neoconservativeideas for transformingyet perpetuatingthe
corporatistheritagewere the chambersof commerceandindustryandthe weighted
voting classes (curia, or electoral colleges) that evolved after 1848 as nonegalitarianmechanismsfor representingspecial interestsin the emerging age of
mass politics. These institutionswere championednot by antimodernists,but
preciselyby the liberalsthatmen like MullerandVogelsangdespised,showingthat
antimoderists held no monopoly on the corporateparadigm,and that - in the
Austrian context - progressivismand corporatismwere perfectly compatible.
(And after 1945 it wouldbecome clearhow compatiblecorporatistparadigmswere
with social democracy- which, pragmaticallyspeaking,began evolving into a
formof neoliberalismafterthe 1880s.) In fact (andthis is perhapsthe main thesis
of the presentessay), one way to broadlyimagine moder Austrianhistory since
1848 mightbe in termsof a counterpointbetweenliberalandnonliberalvariations
on the corporatisttheme-counterpoint being understoodhere in somethingclose
to its literalmusical sense, i.e., "melodynot single, but moving attendedby one or
morerelatedbutindependentmelodies."'3(Again,to avoidconfusion,theexpression
liberal corporatismis used here to mean corporatistarrangementswithin the
frameworkof the existing or emergingparliamentary/democratic
Rechtsstaat.)
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In view of its overall lack of success as an organizedpolitical movement in
Austria (reaching its nadir in the 1930s and early 1940s), the suggestion that
liberalismmighthelpus understandthepeculiaritiesofAustrianhistorymightseem
far strangerthan the appeal to corporatism. Indeed, a key motif of Hanisch's
imposing survey- even thoughits narrativecommencesin the heydayof cultural
liberalism,the 1890s- is thepersistenceinAustriaofa popularUntertanenmentalitdt
andthe weaknessof liberalism,parliamentaryinstitutions,andcivil society generally. Granted,in Austria(as in Bismarck's Germany)liberalismoperatedunder
significantrestraintsrightfromthe outsetof the parliamentaryerain 1867, since its
delegateshad no solid controlover the appointmentandtenureof cabinetsor over
suffered
militarybudgets.Moreover,uppermiddle-classHonoratiorenliberalismus
soberingsetbacksafter 1879 at the handsof CountTaaffe's "ironring"coalitionof
Slavs, federalists,and clericals (on the imperiallevel) and (in Vienna) amidstthe
rise of mass politicalmovementsof the irrational"sharperkey"(schdrfereTonart):
Socialism, ChristianSocialism, illiberalnationalism,and anti-Semitism.14These
counterliberalfactors assumed preeminenceafter 1945 in the minds of scholars
understandably intent on uncovering the roots of political extremism and
totalitarianismin Austria - e.g., Adam Wandruszka'sclassic, 1954 analysis of
CarlSchorske'sstudiesof fin-de- siecle Vienna,
"Osterreich'spolitischeStruktur,"
and JohnBoyer's books on KarlLueger.'s
Yet despitesuchstresson thedemiseof Honoratiorenliberalismus,
nineteenthcentury liberals did create the rudimentsof a civil society and legal culturethat
would - thoughoften deeply submerged- endureas a liberalstrainin Austrian
history.16Whatis important,in this regard,is not so much liberalismviewed as a
parliamentaryfaction, but liberalism understoodmore broadly as an evolving
spectrumof values,traditions,organizationalmodels, andlegal institutionsleading
toward enhanced freedoms, life chances, opportunities,and human rights. The
subjectof northGermanliberalismhas lately drawnincreasedattentionwithin the
contextof comparativehistory,Habermas'sidea of the publicsphere,andthe work
of David BlackbournandGeoffEley.'7 GeraldStourzh,in the 1986 introductionto
a groupof essays on Habsburg-eraroots of Austria'spresent"socialpartnership,"
devoted serious attentionto nineteenth-centuryliberal currentsin the history of
Austrianlaborrelations;and since 1996, Austro-Germanliberalismhas its social
historian,with the appearanceof PieterJudson'sprize-winningsurveyof the years
1848 to 1914, entitledExclusive Revolutionaries.'8Neither the north nor southGermanliberaltraditionsmay exactly fit the image of Britishliberalismso
often used as the benchmarkfor all liberalisms(even by CentralEuropeanliberals
themselves), but Blackbourn and Eley have amply demonstratedthe fallacy of
judging all liberalismsby an idealizedEnglishstandard- even Britishliberalism
itself.19
As justnoted,liberalismsufferedcripplingpoliticalandphilosophicalsetbacks
in the 1880s, but they were not terminal.The middle-classGermanleft

This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Wed, 29 Oct 2014 16:10:33 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

274

GERMAN STUDIES REVIEW

was not moribund,but evolving. In the context of HabsburgAustria's liberalcorporatist/neo-JosefinianRechtsstaat-satirized(notwithoutreason)as a legalistic nightmareby Kafka and Musil - liberals of the fin-de-siecle modified the
universalistethos and staid and aloof strategiesof theirmid-centurypredecessors,
moving freisinnig politics toward a less generous national liberalism and
Interessenpolitik.As LotharH6beltshowsinhisbookKornblumeundKaiseradler,20
they discovered (as the AmericancongressmanTip O'Neill later said) that "all
politics is local," and that political success in a democraticage and under Old
Austria'spolyglotconditionsdemandedthearticulationof local interests,concerns,
and fears.21This political tropismis often readnarrowlyand againstthe historical
grain, as a slippery slope toward the racialist Germanomaniaof Georg von
Sch6nerer,understoodas portentof Hitler. Hitler certainlycited Sch6nereras a
model, but neitherSchonerernor Hitlerhimself would now be rememberedif not
for WorldWarI and the strangecontingenciescreatedby its aftermath.22
One-dimensionalfocus on prewarextremistsdiverts the spotlight from the
successes of mainstreamnational liberals in the hybridized liberal-corporatist
cultureof Austriapriorto 1914, andinhibitsappreciationof the potentialvitalityof
that political cultureitself, as well as its relevance for today's Austria. Granted,
mainstreamnationalliberalismmoved in a more ethnocentric,populist direction,
andits rhetoricwas frequentlystrident,oftenembracing(dependingon the locality)
anti-Czech, anti-Slovene, or anti-Semiticconceits. The fact that it became less
generousdoes not disqualifyit as liberalism,however,for ungenerousliberalisms
aboundedat the time - not least in Britainand America.
It would be foolish to deny thatnationalliberalism'sadjustmentswere devoid
of disquietingpotential,23or to speculateon the survivalchances of Old Austria's
politicalculturein the absenceof WorldWarI. Whatis clearis that,with its tactical
modifications, pre-1914 liberalism remained quite successful in regional and
municipal politics outside Vienna, domain of the renegade liberal Lueger.24
Schorske'sinterpretation(basedin turnon Wandruszka)depictedAustrianpolitics
as tending only towardso-called "post-liberal"radicalism,but pre-1914 Austria
includedmore thanVienna and was ladenwith otherpossible outcomes.25
frameworkfor civil society - andthe
Thus,a hybridizedliberal/bureaucratic
rudimentsof a political cultureto flesh it out - were indeed serviceablelegacies
of Old Austriato its successor states. True,as Wolfgang Mantlsuggests,26under
the world economic and geopolitical circumstancesthat followed World War I
those rudiments could not take root, and acute political dysfunction was the
consequence.Therewas a dramaticeclipse ofAustrianliberalismand,some feared,
all otherliberalismsworldwide. In thatsetting,therenever could be a mass-based
liberal Lager;the very word "liberal"was additionallyburdenedin the Austrian
contextby associationswiththe 1873stockmarketcrashandphilo-Semitism.What
happenedin WeimarGermanymore gradually- the contractionof the liberal
middle and its absorptioninto polarizedfactions- was alreadylargely a fact in
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Austriain 1919, confirmedby the resoundingfailureof the still-bornBiirgerlichDemokratischePartei in the elections of that year. Even today the term liberal
remainsa political liability,a situationcomplicatedby the persistentMarxistmyth
thatliberalismwas really a way stationfor fascism, andthe fact thatafter 1945 the
wordsliberal,freiheitlich,andwhatwas left of theold nationalliberaltraditionwere
often used as havens by ex-Nazis.27Thereis surelymuch to the notion that,in the
bewilderingconditionsafter 1918, the diverse corporatistmindsetsof the prewar
period helped create a dispositionto support,underestimate,or otherwise fail to
comprehendthe relatedbut distinctlynew phenomenonof fascist corporatism
based on radicallynew concepts of the state,the law, andthe individual.28On the
whole, however,I would arguethatin interwarAustria(as in Germany)the triumph
ofilliberalism was less the resultof declinethatset in before 1914 thanthe product
of short-termcontingenciescreatedby the radicalizingengine of the GreatWar.
The warwas indeeda massive cleavage;it was this "radicalrupture,"as one recent
authorcorrectlyaffirms,that"morethanany kindof perceivedcontinuitybetween
pre-andpostwarGermansociety...producedNationalSocialismin Germany- and
fascism in othercountries."29
Still, revisionist socialism was not swamped by the war, and by the 1920s
Germanand AustrianSocial Democracy (beneaththeir often extremistrhetoric)
had become potentialconduits for revisionist liberalismand liberal corporatism,
shouldfavorableconditionsarise. After 1945, amidstnew circumstancesproduced
by Hitler's defeat and the advent of the Cold War, a hybridized neoliberal
corporatismstrongly indebtedto the statist,bureaucratic,and legalistic political
culture of the late Habsburgpast supplantedthe antiliberalcorporatismsthat
dominatedbetweenthewars. To be sure,nativeliberalism'sfinalvictorycameonly
afternative illiberalismswere crushedby foreignpowers, and following a decade
of alien occupation. But, after all, ten years is not so long a time, and without
substantialrootsin the moder pastthe new neoliberalsystemcouldnot have taken
hold.
In this setting,the hermeticallysealedCatholic,socialist,andnationalistLager
that arose in the 1880s - thatpolarizedAustriaafter 1918 and reducedit to civil
warin the 1930s- wererecastintoneocorporateframeworksforparity,patronage,
mutual consultation,conflict resolution,and resourceallocation.What formerly
dividedthe countrynow held it together.Thepartiesto this Sozialpartnerschaftdid
not call themselvesliberals,but SocialistsandChristianpopulists,andtheirleaders
were certainlynot inspiredby feelings of kinshipwith olderliberaltraditions.Their
actions were often motivated by the narrowestcynicism and expediency.30The
wordsfreiheitlich and liberal, still redolentof musty positivism, dogmatic anticlericalism,andAustro-German
progressivism's moreethnocentricandexclusionary
"nationalliberal"turn on the eve of World War I, were left to the dregs of the
nationalistLager - fatally discreditedby its associationwith Hitler (though its
memberswere eagerlyrecruitedby the SocialistandChristiandemocraticparties).
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Or,the termliberalwas understoodpejorativelyin a doctrinairelaissez-fairesense,
as alien to Austrianlife, a one-dimensionalinterpretationthat seemed ironically
reinforcedby the antistatistviews of the Austrianexile Hayek-to the extent that
these ideas were known at all in post-1945 Austria.
Effortsto weld a non-Socialistandnon-Catholicthirdpartyoptionfromdiverse
middle class, nonunionized,displaced Volksdeutsche,andex-Nazi constituencies,
culminatingin creation of the Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs(FPO) in 1955,
remained factionalized, programmaticallyunstable, and easily stigmatized as
rightist and extremist - not least because the first two FPO leaders were,
respectively, a former minister in Seyss-Inquart'sAnschluss cabinet of 1938
(Anton Reinthaller), and an ex-member of the Waffen-SS (Friedrich Peter).
Initially ostracized,the partyenjoyed minimal electoral success priorto the late
1980s (althoughthe RealpolitikerBruno Kreisky shrewdly employed the small
partyto sustainSocialist cabinetsbetween 1970 and 1983, andthe FPO was even
embracedas a Socialistcoalitionpartnerfrom 1983to 1986).Beneaththe language
and surfacestatic of histoire evenementielle,however,postwarAustriabecame a
capitalistwelfarestateof theneoliberaltype,erectedon neocorporatearrangements
andlinkedeconomicallyto West Germany(whichallowedit to prosper).AndWest
Germany,in its own peculiarway, exhibitedpronouncedneocorporatistfeatures
that stretchedback throughthe Weimarto the Wilhelmineperiod. As usual, the
peculiarities of Austrian history evolved in the context of a broaderGermanlanguageframeworkof historicalpeculiarities.31
Whilecitizensofthe reinventedstatewerestillnotsureifthey were"Austrians,"
"Germans,""Viennese,""Tyrolese,"orkinfolkof some otherHeimat,mostofthem
relishedthe social peace, affluence,andmaterialsecuritysustainedby the system.
Still, the new Kleinosterreichwas not in every respect ideal.32In broad terms,
Philippe Schmitterhas describedthe downsideof neocorporatistpracticesfor any
society:
contributeto "govemability"
arrangements
Althoughthe findingthatcorporatist
and
effectiveness
seemswidelyaccepted,
the
fiscal
citizen
through
greater
compliance,
that
undermine
they surreptitiously
democracy.Organizations
suspicionpersists
specializedprofessionalsgain at the
replacepersonsas the principalparticipants;
to state
expenseof citizenamateurs;directfunctionalchannelsof representation
based
decision
making;monopoliesand
legislative
agenciesdisplaceterritorially
of
at
the
are
access
expense overlappingand competing
recognized
privileged
diminishtheautonomyof localand
national
hierarchies
associations;
comprehensive
specializedorganizations.33
Added to these negatives are complicationsproducedby global change: the
collapse of Soviet Communismand end of the Cold War,populationpressures
createdby attendantmigrationsfrom the south and east, advancingEuropean
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integration(includingAustrianmembershipin the EU in 1995), and fiscal strains
within the neoliberal welfare state, world wide. Since 1989, amidst the altered
setting producedby such changes, it has become fashionableto speak of a "new
political landscape"and impending"paradigmshift" of political cultures in the
second Austrianrepublic.
In today's geopolitical setting it is not (to recall FriedrichHebbel's famous
nineteenth-centuryremark)a matterof imperial,greatpower Austriaserving as a
It is rathera
microcosmictheatrewhere the wider world conductsits rehearsals.34
question of a small Europeancountry where - after a few decades of cozy
consensualismin whichmostpeople generallyknewtheirplace andhow to play the
game - global insecuritiesintrudeandentertheirphase of residualsand reruns.35
The issue fortoday's Austriais one of adjustmentto rapidlychangingcircumstances
by a countrywhich, underthe postwarcollusion of Socialist and ChristianSocial
elites, created(as outlinedabove) a de facto system of social-liberalcorporatismin
the 1950s and 1960s. Buildingon tourismandanindustrializedbaseofnationalized
enterprisesinheritedfrom the Third Reich and which remainedlinked to West
Germany's dynamic economy, Austriaenteredthe ranks of advanced industrial
economies, but remained(obviously) smallerand relativelyless modem than the
leadingworld economies (e.g., its greaterrelianceon heavy industry,greaterlabor
intensiveness,etc.) The collapse of the Soviet empirein 1989 andAustria'sentry
into the EuropeanUnion were merely culminating events in an evolution of
circumstanceswhichbroughtto a headan "erosionof traditional[ideological]subcultures, social fragmentation and particularization, and processes of
Forpolitics in the 1990s this meansfractionalization,identity
individualization."36
politics,theriseofnew interestgroupsandparties,anda new, latetwentieth-century
"sharperkey"in rhetoric.It is thesehistoricallyspecific conditionsofthe 1980s and
1990s thatimpactpresentAustriansocial structuresandvoterbehavior,andthatare
mainly behind the illiberalprotestpopulism exemplified by J6rg Haiderand the
revampedFPO today - not a vestigial fascism or "unmasteredpast."Diethelm
Prowe is correctin maintainingthatthe new wave of populismin Europeis not a
repriseof interwarfascism.37"Classic"fascism (as ErnstNolte argued)shouldbe
understood in its interwar setting, and we need new terms and categories to
designatemovementsthatarise from late twentiethand early twenty-firstcentury
conditions. This is not to deny the many disturbingaspects of the new populism.
And it is not to trivializethe issue of an unmasteredpast. The past is indeed in the
present, and its unmasteredaspects are clearly importantfor the ways Austria's
scholars,novelists, and mass media conceptualizethe country'shistory,which in
turnaffect people's presentbehaviorand theirvisions of the future. It is just that
the issue of an unconqueredpast should not be confused with the mainspringsof
presentpoliticaldynamics.Likethe olderextremism,thenew populismis a product
of social alienation,but thatmalaise is not akin to the victimizationpsychosis and
antimodernistnostalgiathatfed fascismin the 1920sand 1930s. Therootsofprotest
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populismtodaydo not lie in the estrangementofAustrianvotersfromtheconditions
of modem life - democratization,industrialization,secularization,urbanization
- but in fear(increasinglyamongblue collarworkers)thatthe fruitsof these very
modem conditions- securejobs, affluence,andwelfaresafetynets- will be lost.
In a sense, the inventorsof post-1945 Austria'sblack-redconsensualismwere
too successful. They fashioneda model welfare state which integratedordinary
Austrians into modernity. But problems arise when this ingrown elite cannot
quarantineits creationfrom externalchange,and also succumbsto the corrupting
seductionsof wealthandpowerbased on old-boynetworksandbureaucraticbloat
and inbreeding. Nimble opportunistssuch as Jorg Haiderwill, not surprisingly,
arise to capitalize on resentmentsover the "politics as usual" corporatismof
mismanagement,waste, and personalenrichment,and will exploit fears that the
modernizingachievementsof this very corporatistsystem will be squandered.In
his frequentrelianceon the tactics of negative integration,the "telegenic"Haider
may indeed recall der sch6ne KarlLuegerof a previousfin-de-siecle;his speech,
and the unspokenlines between it (like thatof Luegerbefore him), is reckless and
stretches the boundariesof "civil" discourse-a notoriously sensitive issue in
German-speakingEurope,preciselybecause of thatregion's troubledrecentpast.
But the global, European,and local setting in which Haider operates is rather
differentfrom the world of Lueger.
From a new turn-of-the-centurystandpoint, one may hazard some final
thoughtsregardingAustria'spositionin Europe,thecurrentlanguageof scholarship
and politics, and the historiographicaland political relevanceof Austria's liberal
tradition.The thoughtof instrumentalizingheritage,or "memory,"as a means to
noble or ignoble ends, of constructing"usable"pasts to promotecurrentagendas,
must properlyhauntthose who honorthe past's alien integrity- for the good of
presentandfutureas well as the pastitself. Nowherehave orchestrationsof history
been more notoriouslyabusedthanin moder CentralEurope.
Yet pastandpresentareexistentiallyinseparable.Liberalism,as this essay has
argued,has demonstratedvastly more stayingpower thanpunditspredictedin the
troubledaftermathof WorldWarI and the GreatDepression,or even in the more
hopefulwake of WorldWarII. Nowhere,in thosedays,did liberalism'sfuturelook
more bleak than in Germanyand Austria. Today, self-styled "Liberal"parties
remainrelativelyweak sistersin the middleEuropeanpoliticalgame (the FDP, the
FPO). Yet who coulddenythat,atthe endof ourshorttwentiethcentury,neoliberal
structuresgovernthe limitsof thepossible in CentralandWesternEurope,andfree
marketrhetoriccontrols global political discourse? As Austrians,in this world
setting and in the course of a new kind ofAnschluss, engage the German- and
French-ledprocess of EuropeanUnion, sharingthe challenges of inventingthat
emerging polity, they may graduallyfind it increasinglynaturalto attendmore
closely to thecomparativestudy of liberalismin its many guises, to attachgreater
value to CentralEuropeanliberalism'speculiarnativeroots,andto allow a critical
regardforAustria'sown liberaltraditionslargerroomin theirpsychologicalspace.
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In a modest way, somethingof the sorthas been going on for some time now
to the north, in the scholarshipand political discourse of the German Federal
Republic. Despite the still unmasteredpall of Berlin's illiberalpast, the task of
unearthingthe history of CentralEuropeanliberalismis, in fact, slightly easier in
Germany, where the liberal Freie DemokratischePartei - despite its small
electoralbase - playeda key nationalrole as a coalitionpartyfrom 1949 to the late
1990s. In displacedforma new interestin the liberalheritageis actuallymanifest
in Austria,in the guise of heightenedinterestin middle-classsocial history, civil
society, and biirgerlichecultureduringthe late Habsburgperiod. Excavationof
liberalism'slegacy in Austriacan only happenslowly, for in the historicalcontext
of the region's political semantics the word and idea of liberalism must be
disentangledfrom its peculiarliaison with the tacticalrhetoricof late nineteenthanidiom
centurynationalprogressivismandemergingdeutschnationalpopulism,38
ironicallyreinforcedby political speech underpost-1945 contingencies.
In this connection,perhapsthe most interestingHaiderin Austriatoday is not
so much J6rgbut the historianBarbaraHaider. She is the authorof the Austrian
Academy of Sciences' new edition of the protocols of HabsburgReichsrat's
committee of constitutionalinquiryduringlate 1867,39when nineteenth-century
Austro-Germanliberalismcompletedone of its chief tasks:the transformationof
the monarchy'swesternhalf into a parliamentaryRechtsstaat. The catalogof civil
rights producedby this committee later became the backbone of Austria's first
republicanconstitutionin 1920, andunderpinsthe SecondRepublic'sconstitution
of today. In light of the relativelyslight explicit attentionthateven recentAustrian
historians have given to liberalism as a strain in Austria's modem past, it is
noteworthythatBarbaraHaiderdeliberatelypresentsherworkas a "smallpiece of
thepuzzleknownasthe 'historyofliberalism'"in CentralEurope.40Her
introduction
to the protocols is a judicious appreciationof the fact that midnineteenthcentury
Austrianliberalism,despite its manifoldshortcomingsfrompresentperspectives,
createdthe foundationsof a civil society andpoliticalculturethatwould - though
often deeply submerged- endure and become part of a liberal strain of deep
structuralcontinuityin moder Austrianhistory.
Two or three decades ago, a book such as this might have been presentedas
something more abstractand less immediatelyrelevantto presentconcerns- a
contributionto OldAustria'sStaats-undReichsproblem,thehistoryofthe empire's
presumedterminaldysfunctionality,the nationalityproblem,or the political dregs
ofthe 1867Ausgleich.Haider'sgloss ofthe documentsis amodelofhistoriographical
tact,onethatsituatestheprotocolsfirmlyinthepsychicspaceandsocialcircumstances
of theirown time. Yet despiteherhealthyrespectfor old-fashionedVerstehen,the
fact that she conceptualizes her book not only as a contribution to Austria's
"constitutionalandparliamentaryhistory,"but to the historyof liberalismas well,
seems-under presentcircumstances-not merely historiographicallysignificant
but politically aktuell.
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Lookingbackward- andwithoutminimizingthepowerfulilliberalstrandsof
Austrianhistory(one wouldbe utterlyblindto do so) - the storyof Austriabetween
1848 and 1998 looks less like one of liberalism's defeat than one of liberal
continuity,with a spectacularilliberalhiatusbetweenthe Dollfuss dictatorshipof
the 1930's and annihilationof theAnschlussdystopiain 1945. Or,perhaps,it has
been a rollercoasterwith more or less significantliberalupturns: 1848-1849, the
yearsfrom 1867to 1914,the firstrepublicanordealof the 1920s,the erasince 1945.
If the"puzzle"of liberalismeverdoes becomea majorfocus forresearchin Austrian
history, perhapsAustrianswill be slightly betterequipped,in terms of enhanced
awarenessof partof theirheritage,to confronttwenty-first-centurymembershipin
a EuropeanUnionin whichliberalism- in one guise oranother(as a TimesLiterary
Supplementheadlinerecentlydeclared)- is "theonly ideology still afloat."4
Notes
*This is a revised version of a luncheonaddressdeliveredto the GermanStudies
Associationin SaltLakeCity, October9, 1998. I am indebtedto ProfessorEdward
Kaplan of WesternWashingtonUniversity for his comments on the paper. An
earlierversion was presentedat the ThirdSymposiumon GermanHistory at the
Universityof BritishColumbia,May 24, 1997. Some of the essay's languageand
ideaspreviouslyappearedin bookreviewsforthejournalCentralEuropeanHistory
and for the on-line discussion groupHABSBURG.
'Ontheotherhand,theextentof Austria'ssuffering- forwhateverreason- mustnotbe
minimized.Accordingto officialfiguresrelatingto theNaziera,65,459JewishAustrians
werekilled;amongnon-Jewish
Austrians,
2,700wereexecuted,32,600perishedinGestapo
camps,24,300civiliansdiedduringthewar,and247,000soldiers
prisonsorconcentration
werekilledin battleor missingin action.Thisamountsto 5.58percentof thepopulation.
DieterA. Binder,"TheSecondRepublic:AustriaSeenas a Continuum,"
AustrianHistory
Yearbook,26 (1995): 18, n. 3.
2HelmutAndics, Der Staat, den keinerwollte: Osterreich1918-1938 (Vienna, 1962).

3Vienna,1994.
- asidefromtheirpiety,parent/child
of state-building
4Fromthestandpoint
disfunctions,
andcapacityforpatience- therewasless oppositionandmorecontinuity
betweenMaria
sonJosefthanusedtobethought.For
Theresa,epitomeof theBaroque,andherenlightened
a recentstudy,see DerekBeales,JosephII (Cambridge,
1987),volumeI.
TheOxfordCompanionto Politics of the World,ed.
5PhilippeC. Schmitter,"Corporatism,"

JoelKrieger(NewYork,1993),195-98.

6Ibid.,195-96.
7Ibid.,198. Schmitterdescribespluralismas the more characteristicmode of organizing
interests and influence in the "advanced industrial polities" (196) of the mid- and late
twentiethcentury. Indeed,he believes that cases of societies markedby a high degree of
institutionalizedcorporatismhave been "relativelyrare"in history(196). At the same time,
however,he discernsa late-twentieth-centurytrendin thedirectionofcorporatism;forbetter
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orworse, he suggests,all advanceddemocraciesarecurrentlyveeringfromthe"spontaneous,
voluntaristic,and autonomousfeatures of pluralism"toward more structured,organized
interestrepresentationandvicarious(ratherthandirect)participationon thepartof individuals
- traits typical of neocorporatism. Today, Schmitterbelieves, "democracy is being
transformedby modem corporatism.... Organizationsare becoming citizens alongside
individuals. Accountabilityandresponsivenessare increasing,but at the expense of citizen
participationand access for all groups. Competitionis less interorganizationaland more
intraorganizational....all modem democraciesare becoming more 'interested,'organized,
and vicarious"(198).
8Austria,Norway, Sweden,Finland,andtheNetherlandsarefrequentlycitedas thebest-case
examples of neocorporatismin the contemporaryworld. Referringto a chartdesigned to
juxtaposethe ideal-typicalfeaturesof the "purecorporatist"versus"purepluralist"model of
representationandcontrolin currentsocieties, Schmitterasserts:"No existingpolity exactly
replicatesthe arrangementsummarizedin eithercolumn,althoughAustriacomes closest to
the formerand the United States to the latter"(Schmitter,"Corporatism,"196) (emphasis
added). For a good explorationof the subject,andmanyreferencesto the relevantliterature
in political science, sociology, and history, see the essays in GiinterBischof and Anton
Pelinka,eds., Austro-Corporatism:Past, Present,Future,ContemporaryAustrianStudies,
4 (New Brunswick,N.J., 1996).
9Somehelpful steps in this directionhave been made in numerousessays on the history of
Austrianeconomic theoryby the Universityof Vienna economistErichStreisslerand in an
unpublished1984 University of Chicago doctoraldissertationby Paul Silvermanon "Law
and Economics in InterwarVienna: Kelsen, Mises, and the Regenerationof Austrian
Liberalism."
'?PaulSilverman,"TheCameralisticRoots of Menger'sAchievement,"Historyof Political
Economy,22 (1990), supplement: 69-91. For a good appreciationof the importanceof
Austrianlegalism and administrativeculturefor the Austrianeconomic theorists, consult
Silverman'sdissertation,"Lawand Economics in InterwarVienna"(see note 9).
"Mises, a student in Bohm-Bawerk's seminar, was perhaps influenced by the latter's
Laocoon despairover his inabilityto promotereformas financeministeramidstthe coils of
bureaucratichypertrophy.I owe this idea to a suggestionby Erich Streissler.
'2OnBaerenreither,see EverhardHoltmann,"'Sozialpartnerschaft'und 'Sociale Frage':
KorporatistischeTradition in Osterreich: Der Standige Beirat des Arbeitsstatistischen
in der Spathabsburgerzeit,"
Amtes als Beispiel paritatischerInteressenvertretung
Der Staat
27 (1988): 244-49. On Schumpeter,see the recentflurryof studies: EduardMarz,Joseph
Schumpeter: Scholar, Teacher and Politician (New Haven, 1991); Richard Swedberg,
JosephA.Schumpeter:HisLife and Work(Cambridge,1991);RobertLoringAllen, Opening
Doors: TheLifeand WorkofJosephSchumpeter,2 vols. (New Brunswick,N.J., 1991). Erich
Streissler designates Wieser (albeit somewhat ironically) as the "central figure of the
AustrianSchool" in his essay "Armavirumquecano: Friedrichvon Wieser, the Bard as
Economist,"inNorbertLeser,ed.,Die WienerSchulederNationalokonomie(Vienna, 1986),
104. As LotharH6belt notes, "thoroughgoingManchesterLiberalswere scatteredfairly
thinly among Austrian Liberals. The dominant centrist group of the Liberals
almostunequivocallysupportedthe protectivetariff;it was only the Progressives- andnot
even all of them - thatvoted againstthe TariffBill of 1878. But even they did not regard
it as a majorissue.
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'3Webster'sCollegiateDictionary,5thedition(emphasisadded). Onthe generalquestionof
the appropriatenessor inappropriateness
of using the words "liberal"and "corporatist"in
tandem,note the remarksof Schmitter,"Corporatism,"196: "Inthe mid-1970s, a groupof
scholars revived the concept [of corporatism]to describe and explain certain puzzling
featuresof advancedindustrialdemocraciesthatcould not be understoodby the heretofore
dominantparadigm,pluralism. To differentiatethe new varietyfrom discreditedprevious
experiences,thesescholarsusuallyaddeda prefixsuchas 'liberal,''societal,' or 'neo-' to the
corporatistroot."
'4CarlE. Schorske, "Politics in a New Key: An AustrianTriptych,"Journal of Modern
History 39 (Dec. 1967): 343-86.
in HeinrichBenedikt,ed., Geschichte
'5AdamWandruszka,"Osterreichs
politischeStruktur,"
der RepublikOsterreich(Vienna, 1954);CarlSchorske,Fin-de-Siecle Vienna:Politics and
Culture(New York, 1980); JohnW. Boyer, Political Radicalismin Late Imperial Vienna:
Origins of the ChristianSocial Movement,1848-1897 (Chicago, 1981); idem, Cultureand
Political Crisis in Vienna(Chicago, 1995).
'6See also HarryRitter, "Austro-GermanLiberalismand the Moder LiberalTradition,"
GermanStudiesReview 7 (May 1984): 227-48. For a judicious critiqueof older survey
histories and balancedappreciationof more recentwork on HabsburgAustria'semerging
civil society and politics of democraticengagement, consult Gary B. Cohen, "Neither
Absolutism nor Anarchy: New Narrativeson Society and Governmentin Late Imperial
Austria,"AustrianHistory Yearbook29, PartI (1998): 37-61.
'7DavidBlackbournandGeoffEley, ThePeculiaritiesofGermanHistory.BourgeoisSociety
and Politics in Nineteenth-CenturyGermany(New York, 1984). By now the new interest
extendsto the thesis advisorsof some of academichistory'snext generationof practitioners.
A recent graduatestudentworkshop at Harvard(November 1996), for instance, invited
apprenticehistoriansfrom across North America to presenttheir researchon the general
theme of"Liberalismand Civil Society in Moder Britainand Germany."
'8GeraldStourzh,"ZurInstitutionengeschichteder Arbeitsbeziehungenund der sozialen
Sicherung-eine Einfiihrung,"in StourzandMargareteGrandner,eds., HistorischeWurzeln
der Sozial Partnerschaft (Munich, 1986), esp. 25-28; Pieter M. Judson, Exclusive
Revolutionaries:LiberalPolitics, Social Experience,andNationalIdentityin theAustrian
Empire, 1848-1914 (Ann Arbor, 1996). Judson's study won the American Historical
Association's HerbertBaxter Adams Prize for the best book in Europeanhistory in 1998.
See, as well, Judson'sWienBrennt!Die Revolutionvon 1848 undihrliberalesErbe(Vienna,
1998).
'9Thoughthe emphasisin his work has always been on old-style liberalism'sdemise due to
its loss of "social relevance,"JohnBoyer himself notes that after 1867 in Austria liberals
createda hybridizedcivil society in which extensive protectionsfor individualrights and
mechanismsfor effective political action coexisted and interlacedwith broadbureaucratic
imperatives. It was, in his words, a uniquely "complex system of neocorporate and
institutionalprivileges [emphasis added],"a "mixed constitutional-bureaucratic
political
bothgainedconsiderable
systeminwhich theGermanBiirgertumandtheImperialbureaucracy
leverage againstthe rulingsovereign. The Austriansystem combinedboth municipaland
regionalpoliticalautonomywith statecentralismto anextentunprecedentedin Prussiaorthe
rest of centralEurope." JohnW. Boyer, "Freud,Marriage,and LateViennese Liberalism:
A Commentaryfrom 1905,"TheJournalof ModernHistory50 (March1978): 73. See also
Cohen, "NeitherAbsolutismnor Anarchy,"44-48.
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20LotharH6belt, Kornblume und Kaiseradler: Die deutsch-freiheitlichen Parteien
Altosterreichs1882-1918 (Vienna andMunich, 1993).
21Oneof the earliest liberals to learn this was Karl Lueger,who defected to the Christian
Social campandcreateda powerfulpoliticalmachinein Viennausing the political strategies
of what would now be termed"negativeintegration."On Lueger'searly careeras a liberal,
see KarinBrown,Karl Lueger, the Liberal Years: Democracy,MunicipalReform,and the
Strugglefor Power in the ViennaCity Council, 1875-1882 (New York, 1987).
22Ofcourse,WorldWarI did occur,andso in hindsightwe have to takethese extremistsmost
seriously-which most of their contemporariesdid not. If one insists on reading things
againstthe grain,therewere other,"socialliberal"fringegroupson the evolving Germanleft
who oughtto be rememberedas well as the Sch6nerianer,since somethinglike the reformist
liberal system they envisionedhas, today,been in place in CentralEuropefor close to half
a century.Cf. EvaHolleis, Die SozialpolitischePartei: SozialliberaleBestrebungenin Wien
um die Jahrhundertwende(Munich, 1978);IngridBelke, Die sozialreformischenIdeen von
Reformbestrebungen
JosefPopper-Lynkeus(1838-1921) inZusammenhangmitallgemeinen
des WienerBiirgertumsum die Jahrhundertwende(Tiibingen, 1979); Karl Holl, Giinter
Trautmann,andHansVorlander,SozialerLiberalismus
(G6ttingen,1986);RichardCharmatz,
Deutsch-OsterreichischePolitik: Studieniiber den Liberalismusund iiber die auswdrtige
Politik Osterreichs(Leipzig, 1907);HarryRitter,"ProgressiveHistoriansandthe Historical
Imagination in Austria: Heinrich Friedjungand Richard Charmatz,"Austrian History
Yearbook19-20 (1983-1984), PartI, 78-81.
23Seethe concise but subtle exposition in Judson'swork of historicalpopularization,Wien
Brennt!, 144-50.
24Boyer'sformerstress on the liberals' "inabilityto retainlocal and regionalpower bases"
after initial reverses on the imperiallevel in 1879 ("Freud,Marriage,and Late Viennese
Liberalism,"74) has beenprovenwrongby subsequentresearch.It is now widely agreedthat
ourunderstandingof civic cultureand its vitality in late HabsburgAustriahas been skewed
by focusing so much on Viennawhich, except for the fact thatit was the imperialseat, was
in many ways only one of many diverseregionalcases.
25H6belt'sKornblumeundKaiseradlerarguesthat,even on the imperiallevel, liberalswere
more politically successful than was previously thought. Thus, in modified form, liberal
structuresandhabitsof thoughtandactionremainedalive, sustainedin partby a corporatism
compatible with the enlightened bureaucratismof Josefinian rationalismand the more
democraticmechanismsof the constitutionalRechtsstaat.Oneof his morenovel ideasin this
regardis thatthe convolutedsystemof governmentby threatof emergencydecreeemployed
by Austria'sprimeministersafter1900was rathersuitedto local circumstances,andactually
worked, if not always well. At least therewas not paralysis.
26WolfgangMantl,"HistorischeundaktuelleAspekteder6sterreichischenVerfassungsentwicklung
seit 1918," Osterreichin GeschichteundLiteratur36 (1992) 6: 368.
270nthis subject see Max Riedelsperger,TheLingeringShadowof Nazism: TheAustrian
IndependentPartyMovementSince 1945 (New York, 1978);idem.,"FPO:LiberalorNazi?"
in Conquering the Past: Austrian Nazism Yesterdayand Today, ed. Francis Parkinson
(Detroit, 1989): 257-78.
28Wieser,in his Gesetzder Macht (Vienna, 1926), may be a case in point.
29Elisabeth
Domansky,"MilitarizationandReproductionin WorldWarI Germany,"in Geoff
Eley, ed., Society, Culture,and the State in Germany,1870-1930 (Ann Arbor, 1996), 433-
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34. On this pointvis-a-vis Germany,see also the concludingchapterof David Blackboum's
TheLong NineteenthCentury:A Historyof Germany,1780-1918 (New York, 1998).
30Fora concise discussion, see Binder,"The Second Republic,"esp. 19-28 and 36-43.
3On West Germany,see WernerAbelshauser,"TheFirstPost-LiberalNation: Stages in the
Developmentof Moder Corporatismin Germany,"European
HistoryQuarterly14 (1984):
285-318. The mainpillarsof Austria'scomplicatedsystem,putin place in the late 1950s and
early 1960s, were the chambersof labor, agriculture,and commerce (with compulsory
laborforceundertheOsterreichischerGewerkschaftsbund;
membership);a tightlycentralized
the JointCommissionon WagesandPrices(ParitdtatischeKommission-thelinchpinof the
scheme, bringingtogetherstatebureaucrats,party,andunion leaders,formedin 1957); and
a governingtraditionof grandcoalitionsbetween the two main parties(althoughthe OVP
ruledon its own from 1966to 1970,andthe Socialistsgovernedeitheraloneorwith the small
third party, the Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs[FPO] from 1970 to 1986). For a brief
overview see AndreiS. Markovits,"AustrianCorporatismin ComparativePerspective,"in
Bischof and Pelinka,eds., Austro-Corporatism:Past, Present, Future, 5-20.
32Thetitle of KurtWaldheim'sbook notwithstanding-The AustrianExample(New York,
1973). The Germantitle is actuallyDer OsterreichischeWeg.
33Schmitter,
"Corporatism,"197.
34As Tony Judthas said in a well-informedessay, "It has been a long time since Austria
mattered much for anyone who doesn't live there" (which is precisely what Austrian
supportersof Anschlussin all ideological camps fearedduringthe 1920s and 1930s). New
YorkReview of Books, Feb. 15, 1996, 22.
35Hans-GeorgBetz, "The Transformationof the Austrian Party System 1986-1996,"
unpublishedconferencepaper,GermanStudiesAssociation, Seattle,October, 13, 1996.
36Ibid.,12.
37DiethelmProwe, "'Classic' Fascism and the New Radical Right in Western Europe:
Comparisonsand Contrasts,"ContemporaryEuropeanHistory 3 (1994): 289-312.
38Judson,WienBrennt!, aptly characterizesthis language as "a strange blend of shrill,
defensive,nationalistrhetoricandthemostradicallyprogressive,optimisticassertionsof the
effectiveness of educationand science for the good of mankind"(150; see also 151-55).
39Barbara
Haider,Die Protokolle des Verfassungsausschussesdes Reichsratesvom Jahre
1867 (Vienna, 1997).
40Ibid.,11.
41TheTimes
LiterarySupplement,Jan. 16, 1998,6. As this articlewent to pressthe following
essay by PeterPulzer,closely relatedin its concernsandsome of its suggestions,cameto my
attention:"BetweenCollectivismand Liberalism:The Political Evolutionof Austriasince
1945" in KurtRichardLutherand Peter Pulzer, eds., Austria 1945-95: Fifty years of the
second republic (Aldershot,1998), 227-33
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